Coalition for Christian Colleges and Universities
Global Stewardship Initiative
Are We Turning Poor Countries into
Pollution Havens?:
Understanding the Trade/Environment Debate
Judith M. Dean
SAIS, Johns Hopkins University
October 1996
Abstract
Many environmentalists have argued that international trade between industrial and developing countries aggravates environmental damage in those poor countries. There have been calls for trade restrictions against developing countries which do not sustainably manage their own environment. In addition, some existing international agreements which seek to limit global environmental problems include trade sanctions against developing countries which refuse to become signatories. This paper argues that such trade measures will not alleviate environmental problems at best, and will aggravate them at worst. They are also likely to worsen the poverty problem in these countries. Christians must consider not only good stewardship of the environment, but their responsibility to the poor when shaping both environment and trade policy.
I. Introduction
Importing tuna from Mexico kills dolphins. Importing wood products from Indonesia and Brazil helps destroy their tropical forests. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) will cause pollution-intensive industries to relocate to Mexico, making Mexico a pollution haven. China and India will soon become major sources of CFCs, undermining the Montreal Protocol which attempts to protect the ozone layer.
These are but a few of the alarming claims which have painted international trade as the enemy of the environment. Many environmentalists and policymakers in industrial countries have argued that trade between industrial and developing countries aggravates environmental damage in those poor countries. They have therefore called for trade restrictions to reduce this damage. Quite often this is seen in calls for trade barriers against developing countries which do not "sustainably manage" their own environment (Dean 1992a, 1992b; Braga 1992). This is sometimes combined with demands by industrial countries that developing countries increase the stringency with which they regulate environmental damage, to a level comparable to industrial countries (Dean 1992b; Pearson 1992). In addition, some existing international agreements which seek to limit global environmental problems include trade sanctions against developing countries which refuse to become signatories to these agreements (Enders and Porges 1992; Safadi and Low 1992).
Christians are called to be good stewards of the earth that God has given to us. Since that responsibility does not stop at national borders, Christians may be tempted to join in the advocacy of trade restraints for the good of the global environment. After all, if our trade is worsening environmental degradation--particularly in our poor neighbors countries--shouldn't we support such policies?
If we Christians follow this line of reasoning, a serious conflict of interest arises. We are also called to care for the poor, and trade is the friend of the poor. The benefits of trade for raising living standards have long been hailed by economists from both ends of the political spectrum (Caves, et al. 1996). Any sort of trade intervention to correct environmental problems will likely reduce incomes in poor countries. Since in may of these countries traded goods account for a large share of GNP, these effects would be significant.
Are Christians facing an irreconcilable conflict? Must we choose between our responsibility to help the poor and our responsibility to be good stewards of the environment? No. This paper argues that both sound environmental policy and compassionate policies toward the poor call for freer, not restricted trade. Intervention in trade will not alleviate environmental problems at best, and will aggravate them at worst. Such intervention will also likely worsen poverty. Supporting policies which open up world markets (rather than closing them) will not only help the poor, but will foster appropriate and effective solutions to environmental problems.
Part II of this paper discusses reasons why trade is perceived as the
enemy of the environment. Part III explores why trade is the friend of the
poor. The ineffectiveness of trade restraints in correcting environmental
problems is discussed in part IV. Part V concludes.
II. Trade as the Enemy of the Environment?
A. Trade Increases environmental damage
At present, industrial countries are perceived as having on the whole, more stringent environmental standards for air, water, and other types of pollution which are either emitted during production processes (process pollution) or emitted when a product is consumed (product pollution). It is assumed that more stringent standards are usually more costly to meet,1 and therefore that the financial burden of pollution abatement costs (or environmental control costs) on firms in industrial countries exceeds that of those same producers in developing countries. Now the costs of environmental damage are a real part of production costs and should be incorporated into a firm's decision making.2 The assumption is that with relatively lenient standards developing countries will have a comparative advantage in what one might call pollution-intensive goods (e.g., those goods which tend to generate large amounts of process pollution).
Now international trade leads to increased specialization in production toward goods in which a country has a comparative advantage. If the premises above are true, trade would cause developing countries to further specialize in pollution-intensive goods, aggravating damage to their environment. For example, further specialization in wood products on the part of Indonesia, Brazil, Malaysia, and Thailand, or agricultural goods in general on the part of African and many other developing countries is seen as aggravating soil erosion, and loss of soil fertility (among other things). Such specialization might also aggravate global environmental problems such as loss of biodiversity from dwindling forests, or harm to the dolphin population from certain types of tuna fishing.
In light of these concerns, policymakers have suggested several ways in which trade restraints could be used to correct these problems (Dean 1992a). One possibility is to impose punitive trade sanctions on countries which do not sustainably manage their environment. Alternatively, tariffs could be levied which raise the prices of imported goods from countries which have lenient environmental standards, thus eliminating their "unfair advantage." The US attempted to impose a unilateral ban on imports of tuna from Mexico due to the destruction of dolphins by Mexican fishing processes. The EU was considering quantitative restraints on imported wood products which would discriminate between exporting countries which were perceived to satisfy EU criteria for sustainable management, and those which did not (Braga, 1992).
B. Trade Creates Pollution Havens
Some would argue that in addition to further specialization in pollution-intensive goods, developing countries will find themselves hosts to whole industries which have relocated due to these relatively lenient environmental regulations. Environmental control costs are assumed to be a significant part of the costs of production. Thus, avoidance of such costs via relocation would allow developed country industries to regain their "competitive edge."
This was one of the concerns which led to the environmental side agreement negotiated along with the NAFTA. It was feared that significant industrial relocation would occur from the US into Mexico. Most often US policymakers were concerned about loss of US jobs. But such relocation would potentially turn Mexico into a "pollution haven" for heavy polluting industries. For many this is perceived to be too heavy a cost to pay for freer trade.
C. Trade Undermines International Agreements
When we turn to issues such as the potential destruction of the ozone layer due to generation of CFCs (via production or consumption), the problem of environmental degradation becomes global rather than local. That is, damage from the emission of CFCs in one country not only impacts that country's welfare, but spills over borders and impacts the welfare of other countries. A number of industrial countries have initiated calls for international agreements to mutually reduce global environmental problems, such as the Montreal Protocol to reduce CFC emissions. Yet some developing countries refuse to sign on, arguing that the costs to them of reducing CFC emissions to the agreed upon level are too high compared to the benefits they would receive from such reductions (Dean 1992b; Enders and Porges 1992).
This has provoked discussion of blocking trade with non-signatories for two reasons. The first would be as a trade sanction to coerce such countries into signing the agreement. The second would be as a tool to ensure the success of the agreement. Signatories argue that their targets for emissions levels would be undermined without trade restraints against importing goods which generate CFCs from non-signatory countries (Low and Safadi 1992; Blackhurst and Subramanian 1992). For example, if the US agreed to reduce production of products which generate CFCs, but then imported these goods from India, there may be no net reduction in global emission levels.
III. Trade as the Friend of the Poor!
A. Trade Increases Incomes
If trade is the enemy of the environment then the conflict with caring for the poor is readily apparent. This is because one of the most widely agreed upon conclusions in economics is that international trade raises the overall income of a country.3 There are two fundamental reasons for this welfare improvement. First, countries have access to many goods at relatively cheaper prices than in their domestic market; they also find more profitable markets in which to sell many other goods. These are known as the gains from exchange. Second there are the gains from specialization. These come from a reallocation of productive resources in the economy. Production of goods in which the country has a comparative advantage expand, while those sectors displaying comparative disadvantage shrink. Thus overall GNP rises.
Out of the 59 developing countries classified as low-income by the World Bank in 1996, 30 had a 1993 GNP per capita of less than $400 annually (World Bank 1996). Thus expanding national income is critical to raising the welfare of all groups. Twenty-two of these low-income countries had an export to GNP ratio in 1993 of 30% or greater. Thus we would expect that the income effects of increased trade would be significant.
B. Trade Increases Employment of Unskilled Workers
The recent World Bank study on poverty (World Bank 1990) confirms that most of the poor in the developing world live in the rural sector and work in the agricultural sector. Whether rural or urban, the poor are characterized by low levels of skill and education. Since the majority of developing countries presently have a comparative advantage in agricultural products and low-skilled labor intensive products (such as textiles, clothing, electronics, shoes), increased trade should be expected to expand these sectors. This means, in particular, that the gains from trade will be concentrated in the sectors in which the poor tend to work. More open trade should tend to raise the profitability of these sectors, expand employment in them, and pull up low-skilled workers' wages.
Early evidence which supports this is found in Krueger (1978). She shows
that for many developing countries the labor-requirements for exporting
industries are much higher than for import-competing industries. Ravallion
and Huppi (1991) studied the dramatic fall in poverty in Indonesia between
1984 and 1987. They found that the largest part of this reduction was due
to income gains to the rural sector. Though causality has yet to be tested,
this period coincided with a shift away from import-substitution industrialization
to a more outward looking development strategy. Both tariffs and non-tariff
barriers were significantly reduced in Indonesia from the mid-1980s through
the early 1990s (Dean, Desai, Riedel 1994).
C. Trade Improves Quality of and Accessibility to Goods
In addition to the fundamental gains from trade discussed above, more open markets give a country access to newer technologies, both through imitation and through leasing or purchase. This tends to improve the overall quality of goods available--both imported and domestic.
Quite often trade restraints exist against basic consumer goods such
as clothing or household products. In India, for example, there still exists
in effect a ban on the import of all consumer good items (Dean, Desai, Riedel
1994). This results in relatively high prices and low quality for these
basic items. Since such items make up a larger proportion of the expenditure
of poor households, the cost of such trade barriers falls more heavily on
the poor. Thus removal of this bias is an additional source of gain for
the poorer groups in developing countries.
IV. Trade Restraints as Solutions to Environmental Problems
?
A. Trade Restraints are Ineffective and Costly Solutions
The brief discussions above highlight the apparent conflict between addressing the negative effects of trade on environment and recognizing the beneficial effects of trade for the poor. This conflict, however, is more apparent than real. Environmental degradation is generated by production or by consumption of products regardless of the market in which they are eventually sold. Since trade may aggravate environmental problems but is not in itself the root cause of these problems, trade restraints are both a poor environmental policy tool and a costly one.
To illustrate this, let me use the example of Indonesia's 1986 ban on the export of raw logs (Dean 1995). Though not implemented for an environmental reason, many environmental interests in the industrial world have hailed such a policy as a good way of reducing deforestation of tropical forests. The export ban immediately shifted the sale of these logs to Indonesia's domestic market, thus dramatically depressing the price of raw logs. As a result, wood processing industries expanded production, and relied more heavily on the use of this wood. With the growth of the wood processing sectors, it took only a year or so before the production of raw logs exceeded its previous level. In addition, estimates of the waste involved in domestic processing are put at a minimum of 10% of annual harvests.
Thus, the export ban did not achieve the goal of reducing deforestation.
This is because it does not address the root of the problem--internalizing
the costs of loss of soil fertility, etc., into the production of logs.
In fact, an export ban was even more inappropriate in this case, given that
the largest cause of deforestation was land-clearing by low-income farmers
(Braga 1992). Beyond this, such a ban is extremely costly. The shift in
sales from the world market to the local market represented a loss in revenue,
and a shift of resources towards industries in which Indonesia did not have
a comparative advantage.
Empirical evidence thus far shows no evidence that developing countries
tend to have a comparative advantage in pollution-intensive goods (Dean
1996). Evidence from Grossman and Krueger (1993) and Tobey (1990) indicates
that trade in goods is not influenced by low pollution abatement costs.
The study by Lucas, et al. (1992) actually finds that fast-growing low-income
countries which are relatively open to trade have cleaner growth than those
which are relatively closed. This evidence suggests that freer trade shifts
production toward cleaner, not dirtier goods.
B. Trade Restraints are Not Necessary to Avoid
Pollution Havens
The fear that large amounts of industrial flight will occur, turning poor countries into pollution havens appears to be unfounded. There simply is no evidence that this kind of flight is occurring in any significant amount. This is most likely due to the insignificant share of production costs that is attributable to pollution abatement costs in most industries. Even in the US, which is considered to have relatively stringent regulations on many types of industrial pollutants, data show that for most industries, pollution abatement costs are less than 2% of operating costs (Low 1992). Such a small savings is not likely to be sufficient to motivate foreign direct investment (FDI) abroad. Most studies show that variables such as high income levels of the host country, stability of the host country government, availability of good infrastructure, and access to cheaper inputs which are a major part of production costs, are important determinants of FDI.
Is there a danger that poor countries will try to lure industries into relocating by imposing little or no environmental regulation? In a series of studies by Wheeler and various coauthors (e.g. Wang and Wheeler, 1996), evidence is presented which shows that even within poor countries, as incomes rise, communities make more formal and informal efforts to regulate abuse of the environment. Lack of such efforts in communities stems more from lack of information on the potential harm from pollutants than from intentional abuse in order to boost industrial production.
C. Trade Restraints are Not Necessary to Maintain International Agreements
The idea that trade restraints should be used as punitive measures to coerce developing countries into signing international environmental agreements should be something we Christians avoid. Since the costs and benefits of abatement of global "pollution" differ across countries, it is clear that countries are likely to differ as to their desired level of abatement. Consider the Montreal Protocol (MP) as an example. As Enders and Porges (1992) point out, the costs to developing countries of signing the MP are uncertain and probably fairly high. Refrigeration (the principle use of CFCs) is scarce in most poor countries, and yet has significant beneficial health consequences. Alternative refrigerants are very expensive, and owners of these patented technologies may not be interested in licensing them.
To force a country to agree to a targeted abatement level beyond that which it desires is to impose a net loss on that country. It is true that with global spillovers there is a free rider problem. Countries may refuse to bear any of the costs of global abatement, but will indeed benefit from any net reductions carried out by other countries. But imposing an inappropriate common abatement level typically puts too much of the burden on developing countries, hence encouraging them not to participate. Here is a case for negotiation amongst participants as indeed has been done to some extent in the case of the MP.4
That trade restraints against non-signatories (usually poorer developing countries) are critical to attain the objective of an international agreement is disputable. In the case of the MP, signatories agreed to both production and consumption reductions within their own borders. Now a consumption tax on products containing CFCs would reduce consumption from all sources (both domestic and imported). This would be non-discriminatory and in line with the principles of the WTO of national treatment. However, the signatories instead chose to limit consumption via reduction of domestic production and bans on imports from non-signatories. They also chose to ban exports to non-signatories. The latter is not necessary at all to attain domestic objectives, and again is a discriminatory measure. In this case, it appears that these trade restrictions are really for punitive purposes (see above) rather than out of necessity to achieve a global objective.
V. Conclusions
As Christians we are called to both care for our environment as a gift from God, and care for the poor. On the surface it appears that international trade is detrimental to the first goal. Christians might, therefore, be tempted to join the many policymakers who have advocated restraining international trade between industrial and poor countries, for the benefit of the global environment. But international trade brings many benefits to the poor. For this reason, we Christians should carefully examine the issues involved, in order to make wise policy choices. This paper argues that the focus on trade restraints as a solution to environmental problems is in fact misplaced. At best these policies are unnecessarily costly to a country. At worst they do not even achieve the environmental objective they were intended to achieve. Such a focus distracts the debate from the root causes of environmental degradation, and prevents policymakers from implementing policies which actually address those causes.
For the poor, the consequences of using trade measures to address environmental
issues can be particularly great. For many poor countries, tradable goods
are a significant share of GNP. The gains from trade are particularly directed
toward the sectors in which the poor work. Loss of these benefits are likely
to impact the poorest populations disproportionately. In addition, the present
use of trade measures to enforce international environmental agreements
is in some cases simply punitive--to force non-signatories to sign on. For
many developing countries, signing on would mean a net cost (not gain).
Emphasis on more open markets will preserve the benefits of trade for all,
including the poor. It will also allow policymakers to focus on environmental
measures which directly target the causes of degradation. These policies
will be more effective in achieving environmental goals, and should therefore
bring about net gains to countries. Such an emphasis can be preserved even
when dealing with global spillover problems. Negotiation which recognizes
differences in costs and benefits among nations is superior to punitive
trade measures and coercion. When goals differ, a willingness to transfer
funds to the net loser (such as through the Global Environment Facility)
should help achieve global goals in a more equitable way.
Notes
1 There is no necessary correlation between stringency of standards and higher pollution abatement costs between countries.
2 This is a standard case of internalizing the costs of a negative externality generated by a production process.
3 See any standard international economics textbook.
4 Developing countries are allowed to gradually phase in the provisions of the Protocol. See Enders and Porges (1992) for details.
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